This dissertation , first , presents the definition of top management . and based on the analysis of the nature of their work and their behavioral features , this dissertation identifies that , to make sure that the top management ' s behavioral features satisfy the shareholders , it is necessary to perfect all sorts of mechanisms ; practice the labor - based incentive contract between the owner and the top management ; and motivate them through rational compensations 论文首先定义了上市公司高管人员的概念，在分析高管人员工作性质及其行为特征的基础上，指出要使高管人员表现出令股东满意的行为特征，需在完善各种机制的前提下，在企业所有者与高管人员之间实行劳动激励合同，通过合理的薪酬激励高管人员。
Thirdly , based on a review of existing literature on accounting information and the compensation of managerial incentive contracts , this paper gives a mathematical model for claiming residue income among shareholders , managers , and governments by applying game models , which provides a theoretical framework for explaining and devising components of management income and the compensation of managerial incentive contracts 第三，本文在全面分析总结有关会计信息与管理者报酬激励契约研究成果的基础上，应用数学方法，推导出股东、管理者和政府三方进行博弈，分享剩余收入的数学模型，为解释管理者报酬构成及设计切实可行的激励契约提供了理论支持。
Using the method of normative analysis , this paper analyzes the optimal incentive contract systematically points out that there is the problem for long - term incentive insufficient in our mechanism , and then discuss the concrete step and method for the material and un - material incentive deeply 本文运用规范分析的方法对一个最优激励合约进行了系统的分析，指出我国现有的激励机制中存在长效激励不足的问题，进而重点对物质与非物质的长效激励的具体措施与方法进行了深入探讨。
As for the incentive systems innovation ， different contract relations in the technology innovation activities are expounded , and thus different incentive contracts are designed with the principles of the information economics . finally , a case study of welcome ltd . is made . spiral - developing orbit of the company is drawn out and the development strategies in the future are proposed 最后，以维尔康制药有限公司为例，以对各种战略思想及理论的深入分析为基础，总结出企业战略研究重点和螺旋式不断上升发展变化的轨迹，并预测了今后企业战略研究发展的方向，制定了该企业的创新发展战略。
The discourse analyzed the traditional net income and the stock price performance evaluation indexes , proposed that the connection between the economic value added ( eva ) and the market value added ( mva ) supervises the operator performance evaluation , and designed the long - term and the short - term ’ s incentive contracts based on the chosen performance evaluation indexes . we proposed some advices to enterprises in china which execute the operator performance evaluation finally 并具体分析了传统的净收益和股价业绩评价指标的不足,提出以经济增加值( eva )和市场增加值( mva )相结合作为激励导向的经营者业绩评价指标,并以所选择的业绩评价指标为基础,设计了长期激励与短期激励相结合的经营者激励报酬契约。
By resorting to theories of control , efficient markets hypothesis , information , interest interrelation , public choice , as well as regulation theory and principal - agent theory , this paper gives an extensive coverage on how the accounting system acts in the cycle of supply , control and needs , thus leading to a theory upon which to build a system of compensation of managerial incentive contracts by the use of accounting information theory 其次，本文应用控制理论、有效市场理论、信息理论、利益相关性理论、公共选择理论、管制理论和委托代理理论等，全面系统地研究了会计信息在供给、控制和需求几个环节中的作用规律，为应用会计信息理论构建管理者报酬激励契约提供了理论依据。
By analyzing how accounting information acts upon the compensation of managerial incentive contracts , this author holds that accounting information can be employed to evaluate and compensate managerial efforts , and then further explores approaches to performance measurement , the importance and limitations of the relative performance evaluation ( rpe ) 通过对会计信息在管理者报酬激励契约中作用方式的研究，提出根据会计信息可以评价和激励管理者努力工作，并进一步探讨如何更好地选择业绩衡量方法及相对业绩评价( rpe )的重要作用及缺陷。
It is a challenging task to conduct research on the compensation of managerial incentive contracts based on the accounting information theory . in china , this issue has not been brought into attention until recently . however , there is still a lack of consistent , comprehensive , and valid research findings , leaving much to be done both in theory and practice 关于会计信息与管理者报酬激励机制关系的研究，由于涉及公司治理的较深层次，相当一个时期以来在国外一直是一个研究热点，近期国内对此问题也展丌了一些研究，但迄今为止，尚缺乏系统、完整和公认的研究成果。
